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Abstract
This article explores the changing accountability role that Indonesian local government
reporting has played by exploring a Local Government Under Study’s (LGUS) accountability
report process. The study uses an interpretive (social constructionist) methodology. A case
study method (including historical records and interviews, as well as direct observations) is
used through an institutional theory lens to interpret local reporting behaviour. Local
government currently submits accountability reports to three parties: the central government,
the local parliament and the public. However, while the public now receives a report, it
contains only a summary of the report submitted to the central government and is often not
made available in a timely manner. The authors recommend that a full report (in similar
format and detail to that made available to Central Government) be made available to the
public. The accountability forum is currently largely ceremonial and symbolic. In order to
better meet the requirements of accountability, the authors recommend that this forum allow
for questions about the Local Governments’ activities to be asked and responded to in a
public forum. As with any case study, themes reflected in this study are not necessarily
generalizable.
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Introduction
This article explores local government reporting and accountability mechanisms in Indonesia
following the fall of the Soeharto Government. Under the regime of President Soeharto
(1967-1998), local government accountability was controlled by the Central Government
(Suryadinata, 2007; Liddle, 1985). It was possible that this was due to public officials of local
governments being more loyal (and accountable) to the regime, rather than to the public. Not
surprisingly, the accountability system of local government at that time was designed to be
more accountable to the central government than to the people. As such, local government
legislation did not consider the Public as a party to whom the government should be
accountable to the extent of keeping them well-informed on local government matters. This
article begins with a brief summary of changes to local government reporting legislation after
the fall of the Soeharto regime in 1998.
Habibie succeeded Soeharto as the third Indonesian president. The Habibie administration
passed a number of laws relevant to this article, including Law No. 22 (1999) on Local
Government and Law No. 25 (1999) on Fiscal Decentralisation and Revenue Sharing.
According to Anwar (2010) the emergence of these two laws was the cornerstone for
decentralisation reforms after more than three decades of Indonesia being socially, politically
and economically controlled by the Soeharto regime. Law No. 25 (1999) granted a greater
power to local governments to manage their locally-generated revenues, alongside money
transferred in by central government.
The important feature of Law No. 22 (1999) for the purpose of this article was to grant a
greater authority to local governments in managing their respective regions, except in five
key areas: defence and security; foreign affairs; fiscal and monetary policy; law enforcement;
and religious affairs which were still under the Central Government's authority. Law No. 22
(1999) required the head of local governments to submit their accountability reports to two
parties: the President and the Local Parliament. This law strengthened the role of the
accountability forum by granting authority to Local Parliament to impose some sanctions on
Heads of the Local Parliament, if the latter’s accountability report was rejected by the Local
Parliament as being inadequate.
In 2004, the Megawati administration (2001-2004) endorsed new laws including Law No. 17
(2003) on State Finance; Law No. 1 (2004) on the State Treasury; Law No. 33 (2004) on the
Fiscal Balance between the Central and Local Government; and Law No. 32 (2004) on Local
Government replacing the existing accountability and local government laws. These laws
marked a new chapter in the history of local government accountability systems, in which the
law regarded the public, as well as the central government and local parliament, as one of the
proper audiences for local government accountability reports. The law required local
government to submit accountability reports to the central government and local parliament,
and to make an accountability report available to the public. Particularly relevant to this
article, Law No. 32 (2004) on Local Government replaced Habibie’s Law No. 22 (1999) on
Local Government. Law No. 32 (2004) required Local Governments to submit accountability
reports to the Central Government and Local Parliament (the LPPD and LKPj, respectively),
and to make an accountability report (the ILPPD) available to the Public. This law also
stipulated that the heads of provincial and district government were to be directly elected by
people; thus they were no longer appointed by local parliament as regulated in Law No. 22
(1999). However, Law No. 32 (2004) abolished the authority of local parliaments’
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Accountability Forums to impose sanctions on the Head of local government, as stipulated in
Law No. 22 (1999). This has constituted a drawback for the local government accountability
forum, since the forum has now lost its capacity to possibly impose sanctions as suggested by
Bovens (2007) and Mulgan (2000). Law No. 32 required the submission by local government
of three accountability reports annually: the Implementation of Governance of Local
Government Report, submitted to the Central Government; the Explanatory Report on
Accountability, submitted to the local parliament; and the Information on the Implementation
of Governance of Local Government Report, to be made available to the general population.
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono served as the sixth Indonesian President between 2004 and
2009, after defeating the incumbent president, Megawati Soekarnoputri, in the first direct
presidential election in 2004. The Yudhoyono administration endorsed Government
Regulation No. 3 (2007) on Accountability Reporting of Local Government which regulates
the mechanism of local government accountability reporting in more detail. However, among
the three entities to whom the local government reports, the public receives the most limited
information, as the accountability report they receive (ILPPD) is now only a summary of that
submitted to the central government (LPPD). A study conducted by the DRSP (2009)
revealed that Indonesian local governments’ accountability reports contained poor-quality
data. Smoke (2005) noted that although Indonesian local governments are required to comply
with various forms of public reporting, they lacked transparency in managing their
administrations. The Explanatory Report on Accountability consists of the same contents as
the Implementation of Governance of Local Government Report, with the addition of two
other aspects: the general direction of the local government’s policies and a general
explanation of the local government’s financial management. The Implementation of
Governance of Local Government Report essentially summarises the Implementation of
Governance of Local Government Report but gives less detail. However, GR No. 3 (2007)
does not clearly specify which key information or data the report should contain. The fact that
the ILGLGR is only a summary of the Implementation of Governance of Local Government
Report could suggest that among the three parties— the central government, local parliament
and local population—the last is considered the least important. This is paradoxical, because
people directly elect the heads of local governments, yet when it comes to the local
governments’ accountability reports the public can only access limited information.
However, in 2007, the Yudhoyono administration issued Government Regulation (GR) No. 3
on Accountability Reporting of Local Governments. This regulation provided guidance on
the mechanism and contents of local government accountability reporting. A critical
ingredient of GR No. 3 is the provision of accountability forums in which the power-holder is
held accountable by another party. However, this accountability forum is only implemented
at the level of the local parliament, and does not include the public.
This study explores the practice of accountability reporting in Indonesian local government
following the decentralisation reform that occurred in 1999. It also investigates the role
played by local parliament in assessing the report since the dramatic changes in the sociopolitical landscape in the post-Soeharto era: from authoritarian and centralised to democratic
and decentralised; and from a limited political party system to a multi-party system.
This study was conducted in 2009 in one local government in the Republic of Indonesia. In
collecting data, the study used direct observation, interviews and documentation. Data was
collected by observation in the site for six months. To get a richer understanding, open-ended
interviews were carried out with key persons or informants within the LGUS office. This
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study also involved attendance at a local parliament meeting in which the governor of LGUS
delivered his administration’s accountability report to the members of the Local Parliament.
Literature Review
A brief history of local government reporting post-Soeharto in the previous section illustrates
the changes in local government reporting requirements since 1998 in Indonesia. The
following literature review illustrates why these changes are important in terms of local
governments fulfilling some of the important requirements for accountability to the public.
The change of government system from a centralised to a decentralised model (from 1998
onwards) did not automatically improve the local government accountability system,
including its accountability reporting. Government Regulation (GR) No. 3 of 2007 on
Accountability Reporting of Local Government, for example, required local governments to
submit separate accountability reports to the Central Government and the relevant local
parliament and to make a summarised accountability report available to the Public. Thus, the
Public received limited information, in the form of a summary of the accountability report
submitted to the central government. It should be noted that the reports rendered to the
Central Government and made available to the public were not accompanied by an
accountability forum, in which the Governor would discharge his or her Administration’s
accountability before relevant parties, such as citizens. Instead, the accountability forum was
only available within the local parliament.
These phenomena are consistent with the results of Goetz and Jenkins (2001), and support the
notion that there is a lack of public trust in political and administrative forms of
accountability in most developing countries. In the Indonesian context, these phenomena are
partly caused by the lack of institutional capacity of Indonesian local governments (DRSP,
2009; Harun & Kamase, 2012). Mountfield and Wong (2005, p. 89) disclosed another cause
for distrust: Indonesian local governments’ “monitoring and accounting systems often
produce data that are neither timely nor accurate”. Specifically, Smoke (2005) found that
even though various forms of public reporting were required, the transparency of Indonesian
local governments was still weak. Studies conducted by the Democratic Reform Support
Program (DRSP, 2009) and Harun and Kamase (2012) found that Indonesian local
governments lacked institutional capacity in preparing their accountability reports. On the
legislative side, two studies conducted by the DRSP (2009) and the Asian Development Bank
(ADB, 2004) revealed that Indonesian local parliaments had an inadequate capacity in
evaluating local government accountability reports. Green (2005) noted that Indonesian local
parliaments did not possess proper criteria with which to assess local government
accountability reports.
Bovens (2007, p.450) defined accountability as follows:
‘Accountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the
actor has an obligation to explain and justify his or her conduct, the forum can
pose questions and pass judgement and the actor may face consequences.’
Accountability is a salient feature of democracy, as noted by Castiglione (2007) Romzek and
Dubnick (1987), Aucoin and Heintzman (2000), and Boyne and Law (1991). In the
Indonesian context, although the country has embraced the democratic system for more than
a decade since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, the practice of accountability reporting is still far
from ideal. In terms of local government accountability reporting, for instance, the public has
yet to be regarded as an important and appropriate audience for the full Local Government
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Report. Further, accountability reports play a major role as a medium of accountability
discharge in the public sector (Taylor & Rosair, 2000; Coy & Pratt, 1998; Sinclair, 1995). In
the case of Indonesian local governments, this role has not yet developed, as the transparency
of Indonesian local government is still embryonic (see Harun et al., 2012; DRSP, 2009;
Smoke, 2005). This happens when the ruling elites are reluctant to implement a wholehearted
reform, as transparency can potentially ‘disrupt’ the ‘games’ they usually play (Harun, 2007).
Also, accountability reporting also serves as an input for parliamentary scrutiny (Rahman,
2008; Bovens, 2007; Hughes, 2003; Mulgan, 2001).
Accountability is not a concept with a clear and universally held meaning. Bovens (2010)
asserted that some politicians have used the term ‘accountability’ merely as political jargon.
Former US President George Bush, for instance, used the word ‘accountability’ as a political
mantra in condemning the executives of Enron and WorldCom for their financial crimes
(Dubnick, 2002). This was possible because the term of accountability has ‘a power’ and
symbolism that can bolster the image of its user (Dubnick, 2002).
Kelly (2007) argued that accountability for performance can constitute a trap in which the
[public] employee is more likely to adhere to organisation’s standards rather than to serve the
[citizens or] clients. In pursuing effectiveness, for instance, the organisation establishes
certain standards for the amount of time spent dealing with each client. If a given employee
can serve the client in that time (or faster), it means that the employee is accountable. In other
words, the employee becomes accountable for his or her performance “by working for the
measures and not for his or her client” (Kelly, 2007). However, Bovens (2005, 2007) argued
that public-office holders should serve citizenries well, as they have mandated the executives
to do so. To make sure the executives can meet the reasonable expectations of the citizens,
Bovens (2007) proposed that agencies or individual public managers are held accountable in
a social accountability forum.
In Indonesian context, during the Soeharto regime of more than three decades (1960s-1990s),
the term ‘good governance’ was extensively used to strengthen the regime’s legitimacy.
Bovens (2010) noted that accountability is often used interchangeably used with terms such
as good governance, transparency, equity, responsibility and integrity. However, the term
concealed an unpleasant level of collusions, corruption and nepotism (Tambunan, 2000). The
term ‘accountability’ was easy to abuse because it was defined so loosely (Bovens, 2010)
Despite some shortcomings inherent in the accountability concept, its existence matters in the
public sphere, particularly in governance practices. Principally, accountability is the essential
element of democracy (Kluvers, 2003; Skogstad, 2003; Bovens, 2005b; Markoff, 2005;
Hodge, 2009), through which public officials are monitored and held accountable in order to
keep them on the right track in running their administrations (Aucoin & Heintzman, 2000;
Bovens, 2007).
Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) noted that accountability serves three functions: accountability
as control; accountability as assurance; and accountability as continous improvement.
However, in Indonesian context, the absence of accountability as a control made the
authoritarian Soeharto regime persisted its power for more than three decades (1967-1998)
(Liddle, 1985). In relation to the second function, laws and regulations passed by the regime
was not intended to protect people interests, instead the regime’ wishes (Bünte & Ufen,
2009), thus this function did not exist during this era. As a result, accountability could not
manifest as ‘lifeblood’ in protecting the people’s interests as noted by Hodge (2009, p. 1).
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A large and growing body of literature has investigated the practice of accountability
reporting in local government. Some researchers have conducted their research in the
developed countries such as the UK (Butterworth et al., 1989; Boyne & Law, 1991); Spain
(Benito et al., 2003); Italy (Steccolini, 2004); and Australia (Kloot & Martin, 2001, 2007;
Ryan et al., 2002; Kluvers; 2003; Mack & Ryan, 2007). Other researchers have carried out
their studies in developing countries such as Bangladesh (Samaratunge et al., 2008); Malaysia
(Khalid, 2008); and Indonesia (Harun, 2007; Martani & Liestiani, 2010; Akbar et al., 2012;
Harun & Kamase, 2012).
The above studies resulted in mixed results worthy of attention. Simon and Ridley (1938) and
Butterworth et al. (1989) found that local-government reports were less than readable, as
statistical data were left without interpretation (Simon and Ridley, 1938). Butterworth et al.
(1989, p.84) concluded that the local-governments that “local authorities do not intend their
report to be read.” Steccolini (2004) noticed that accounting reforms were conducted through
a bureaucratic approach. This in turn led to the accounting reform and reporting system
merely serving as an administrative procedure rather than an innovation to address citizens’
expectations.
Likewise, Harun (2007) noted that Indonesia’s public sector reform seems to be undermined
by central government officials, as the implementation of accountability demands more
transparency about what has been done by them. This led to them being reluctant in
implementing such reforms. This is consistent with claim made by Christensen et al. (2007)
that public organisations’ leaders used political rhetoric to convince people that they had
adopted public-sector reform whereas in fact they implemented the reform in a ‘cosmetic’
way, as a symbolic display.
In relation to the contents of the accountability reports, Bovens (2007) asserted that
‘accountability’ incorporates several aspects rendered to different stakeholders: financial,
procedural and product. Aucoin and Heintzman (2000) and Kluvers (2003) added it should
also include a performance aspect. Therefore, annual reporting should contain financial,
procedural, product and performance aspects. Boyne and Law (1991), asserted that an annual
report is a set of comprehensive information prepared in pursuing accountability to the
principal. Similarly, Ryan et al. (2002) argued that an annual report is a crucial medium of
accountability for governmental organisations.

Theoretical Framework and Research Methodology
Theoretical framework
This study draws on institutional theory as its main theoretical lens to explore how the change
of government system from centralised to de-centralised affected its accountability reporting.
In a study investigating a governmental organisation, Fogarty (1996) maintained that
institutional theory can shed light on this area. Similarly, Scapens (1994) held that
institutional theory can be employed to understand accounting practice since the theory can
provide insights concerning the interplay between accounting and the institutions, in which it
operates. According to Meyer and Rowan (1977), the existence of formal organisational
structures is a manifestation of rationalised institutional rules. They explained that
institutional rules such as myths and symbols are important, as it is through them that
organisations obtain resources and legitimacy as well as maintain their existence.
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This is congruent with the nature of governmental organisations, which commonly exercise
their coercive power by imposing regulations (Scott, 2008). Christensen et al. (2007, p. 69)
note that public organisations are “arenas for exercising power, negotiating alliances and
coping with conflict”. Accounting, for instance, is employed by organisations partly to secure
legitimacy. This practice then brings accounting closer with politics: “the language of politics
is seen written largely in a language of accounting” (Watkins & Arrington, 2007, p. 55).
Covalesky and Dirsmith (1990, p. 546) had a similar standpoint saying that “…accounting
appears to serve several technical, political and symbolic roles, and within the symbolic role,
at multiple levels…”. Likewise, Hopwoood (1976) maintaines the importance of conducting
research in which accounting is viewed as both an organisational and a social phenomenon.
Hopwood (1983) also stressed that accounting should be studied in the context where it exists
because organisations are embedded in a particular environment. Therefore, the new
institutional theory can be an instrumental compass in addressing research questions raised
through highlighting the role of socio-political context in affecting and shaping the practice
of accounting and can shed light on how accounting is employed in the political arena, either
in a symbolic role in overseeing executives or as a rational and technical device in assessing
local government accountability reports.
Research methodology
Gaffikin (2008) identifies non-realist ontology as a belief that objects around us that are
socially constructed. In examining non-realist ontology, Creswell (1998) stated that reality is
constructed by individuals engaged in the social environment of the community. This study
perceives that accountability reports are socially constructed by the actors to obtain
legitimacy and maintain power. This study uses a qualitative approach, examining and
reflecting on perceptions of socially-constructed reality (Collis & Hussey, 2003; Denzin &
Lincoln, 2005). The case-study approach was adopted as it meets Yin’s (2003) criteria and
due to its strength in conveying a holistic and rich understanding of issues within their
environmental setting.
Considering the nature of qualitative research which relies on interpretive or critical social
science (Neuman, 2006), this study is not intended to examine hypotheses, rather it is to
understand the practice of accountability reports as applied by Indonesian local government
as well as the role of local parliament in assessing such reports. In doing so the study uses
four sources of evidence: interviews, direct observations, documentation and archival
records, along with open-ended interviews as suggested by Yin (2003). The open-ended
interview is “a type of survey research question in which respondents are free to offer any
answer they wish to the question” (Neuman, 2006, p. 286).

Discussion and Implications
This study examines accountability in the form of the move to accrual accounting and public
reporting and argues that these reforms, as practiced, are routine and socially constructed by
the actors in order to obtain legitimacy and maintain power.
Accountability Reports
Accepting that accountability is an obligation to provide an explanation or justification and to
accept responsibility for events, transactions and one’s own actions the interviews reveal a
gap between the espoused values and day-to-day practices. P1, a senior official in the Bureau
of Governance said that:
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I have held the post of X in the Bureau of Governance about five years
consecutively, and have worked with three different governors. Due to this
lengthy period, I feel bored because the tasks become routine activities and it is
not healthy for an ideal organisation.
Here (within the LGUS) human resources are not yet considered as a valuable
asset. Therefore, it is quite hard to find professional civil servants.
Mr. P1 further said:
I do not want to beg my superiors for a new post, because in my understanding a
post is a responsibility that has to be performed properly.
Mr. P1 was afterwards removed from his position and installed as a local development
specialist at another work unit under the LGUS.
Mr. P2, an official in the Bureau of Governance described this circumstance:
If one wishes to be an official or occupy a higher post, he or she has to
“shrewdly play” to both the superior and the subordinate. Otherwise, he or she
encounters difficulties in getting the desired post.
He continued that there was an “informal assessment” that was entirely anecdotal; however, it
was frequently practiced by superiors in "testing" subordinates’ level of "obedience".
The post left by Mr. P1 was then occupied by Mr. B, a senior official from another work unit
under the LGUS. Mr. P3, an official in the Bureau of Governance commented:
Mr. B is nearly retired, but he is seemingly retained by the governor due to their
good relationship between them. In my view, he is an inappropriate person to
occupy this post because this bureau requires a dynamic official in addressing
challenging issues.
Formally, all civil servants are annually assessed using the Civil Service Performance
Appraisal. The elements assessed in the appraisal include loyalty, work performance,
responsibility, obedience, honesty, cooperation, initiative and leadership.
However, it seems the appraisal only serves as a formal procedure. In reality, other aspects
outside the assessment determine a civil servants’ career path such as fostering good
relationships by being submissive to superiors. This is consistent with the study by Turner et
al. (2009) of human resource management of Indonesian civil servants and found that the
civil performance appraisal put more emphasis on loyalty to the state than on encouraging the
civil servants in goal-oriented performance.
Mr. B, a new senior official of the Bureau of Governance was responsible for preparing the
accountability reports. He declined an interview, saying:
I have just been appointed to this post recently, so I do not know a lot about
accountability reports. I also have already delegated this matter to my
subordinates.
This statement confirms the general opinion that the new senior officials might not be the
appropriate official to hold the post in the Bureau of Governance as their knowledge of the
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basic principles of accountability reporting were limited. This attitude to accountability
reporting is also reflected in the response by Mr P3:
One of the major problems we face every year in preparing the accountability
reports is that the work units are always late in sending their reports.
It is also relevant to note a comment made by Mr. P2:
I have been working here (LGUS) for more than 10 years. During this period, I
have observed that most civil servants here have not properly acknowledged the
importance of data. The data has been collected over the years and financed
with no little amount of money, but when data was needed by other work units,
the person in charge just simply responded, “I forgot where I put it”.
Regarding the delegation of authority for the preparation of the reports Mr. P4 commented:
There is, like, a "tradition" here that echelon IV always becomes the backbone of
work programs conducted by the LGUS, including preparing the accountability
reports. Higher-echelon officials usually delegate their tasks to lower officials
(echelon IV). However, if there is a mistake, the former will blame the latter.
With respect to the obligation of accountability to execute assigned responsibilities Mr. P4
commented:
Frankly speaking, given this situation in which only a small number of people
are involved in this activity, I could not verify the reliability of the reports sent
by the work units. In other words, we, the special committee, are only the
compilers of the reports and are not responsible for the substance contained in
the reports.
He further said that:
The preparation of accountability reports in practice is a routine activity in
which we do just what we did in previous years.
Because the practice of accountability reports tends to be routine, it leads some work units to
merely replicate the previous year’s report. Mr. P3 commented:
Some work units submitted their own accountability reports by simply copying
and pasting from previous year without thoroughly verifying them. Such
practices happen because the heads of the work units do not pay attention and
just submit the reports prepared by their subordinates.
Mr. P6, an official in the Accounting Division described his division’s activities:
What we do here is mostly routine activities, because our work basically follows
the accounting cycle starting from identifying through measuring, recording,
adjusting, preparing, and submitting the financial statement based on rules and
regulations issued by the central government.
Mr. P5, a senior official of the Monitoring and Governance Evaluation Division, who is also
the acting head of the secretariat committee of the task force for preparing the accountability
reports, concurred:
We have to verify accountability reports sent by work units first. This is because
we find that several work units carelessly submit their reports by copying and
pasting from the previous year.
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The Accountability Forum
It is generally accepted that accountability is results-oriented, that is, it concentrates on
performance results, and as such requires dissemination of information on results and
performance. This is supposed to be achieved through providing an account of actions and
results and providing tangible evidence of results by the Governor (and other members of the
LGUS) before the members of the local government parliament.
Ideally, the current accountability forum would be a forum in which power-holders are
obliged to explain and justify their conduct, and questions may be asked. Recommendations
emerging from the forum should ideally have the possibility of imposing sanctions on the
power-holders where appropriate. However, this is not the reality. Currently, there is no legal
requirement for the power holder (Governor) to respond to questions from the forum or even
to allow questions to be asked. The absence of this question and answer requirement reduces
public interest and participation, as does the absence of a requirement to make the full local
government report available to the public. Similarly, aspects of accountability required by
Bovens (2007) are absent.
Mr. P3, an official in the Bureau of Governance, made a comment as to why the questionand-answer session may not be held:
There is nothing wrong with the agenda of the forum in which the question-andanswer session (is) absent. GR No. 3 (2007) does not regulate that the
accountability forum has to include one.
This lack of opportunity to question the accountability report is further exacerbated by the
lack of measures of assessment. When Mr. P11, an elected representative from the region,
was asked how the members of the local parliament assessed the accountability report, he
replied that:
To date we do not have a benchmark on how to assess the executive’s
accountability report, such as key performance indicators (KPI) and control
mechanisms for measures and policies exercised by the executive. On top of that,
we even do not have an internal control mechanism for our own activities.
He added:
My fellow members of the local parliament tend to be reluctant to discuss and
review things considered complicated issues, including assessing the
accountability report, as this requires willingness and expertise.
He then gave an example:
In terms of the local parliament’s annual work plan, we set the same programs
as in previous years without any significant change.
That is why the accountability forum, in which local parliament is supposed to
play its roles in controlling and assessing the performance of the executive, is no
more than a “ritual” arrangement held annually.
Therefore, it is hard to expect that the accountability forum could stimulate the Governor to
perform better, in the absence of proper control from the legislative body.
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The results of this study suggest that the accountability forum held by the local parliament
faces a dilemma. On the one hand, the accountability forum needs the authority to impose
sanctions on the head of the local government in order to keep local government in check. On
the other hand, such authority has been abolished by law because the there is a tendency for
members of parliament to wish to avoid greater public scrutiny. It is apparent that in its
accountability forum the Local Parliament failed to implement the functions of accountability
set out by Aucoin and Heintzman (2000),and Bovens (2007).
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The empirical findings presented above suggest that by conforming to, and relying on,
existing rules and routines the accountability reports become institutionalised or authoritative
guidelines for social behaviour (Scott, 2008; Zucker, 1987). Further, these processes where
persons and groups interacting in a social system create concepts of each other's actions and
these concepts eventually become habituated. As such concepts of what reality is become
embedded in the institutional fabric of society and is therefore said to be socially constructed
(Berger & Luckmann, 1966).
The Accountability Forum, exercised by the local parliament, seems currently to merely serve
as a ceremonial and symbolic arrangement held to meet the requirements of the relevant
regulatory provisions, rather than as a genuine instrument for accountability to the public.
The adoption of the Accountability Forum as part of public-sector reforms to strengthen
government accountability, currently serves merely as a symbol of accountability, rather than
genuinely making the local government more accountable, effective and efficient (Scapens
1994; Carruthers 1995; Covaleski et al. 1996). In order to better discharge the requirements
of accountability as defined by Bovens (2007) discussed earlier in this article, the authors
recommend that a full accountability report be made available to the public by means of an
easily accessed website and that printed copies of the report supplied to those who request
them. Further, the Accountability Forum should be restructured to allow questions to be
asked and answered. Meaningful sanctions should be available to the Forum to impose upon
local governments failing to adequately respond to the forum where appropriate. If this were
to be done, the Accountability Forum would better meet the requirements of accountability.
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